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The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and
Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Under ERISA
Jana K. Strain, J.D.* & EleanorD. Kinney, J.D., M.P.H.**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The American health insurance market needs reform. Historically,
states regulated insurance markets, yet the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") precludes the states from regulating employer-sponsored health plans covered by ERISA.1 ERISA
regulates most employee health insurance plans because most working,2
non-elderly people obtain health coverage through their employment.
The resulting bifurcation in the regulation of the American private
3
health insurance market thwarts state reform of the insurance market.
*Law Clerk to The Honorable Brent E. Dickson, Justice of the Supreme Court of Indiana. J.D.,
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1997; B.A. Psychology, Indiana State University, 1986; M.S. Marriage and Family Therapy, Butler University, 1990. The authors would like
to thank Phyllis Bonds, Chris Paynter and James Martin for their assistance and support in completing this project.
.'J.D., Duke University, 1973; M.P.H., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979;
A.B.,
Duke University, 1969. Professor of Law and Co-Director, The Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
1. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 - 1191c. (West 1999).
2. See infra Part II (discussing state and federal regulation of health insurance and federal preemption of state regulation on health insurance).
3. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriersto Increasing Health Care
Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990) (concluding that federal statutory
action is needed to improve health care access and that in the absence of federal action, Congress
should amend ERISA to allow state regulation); Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan,
The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 142 (1994) (explaining the
ERISA preemption clause and the limitations it places on the Health Security Act); Margaret G.
Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed
Federalism,23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997) (explaining the need for managed federalism in reforming health care); Lawrence 0. Gostin & Alan I. Widiss, What's Wrong with the ERISA Vacuum? Employer's Freedom to Limit Health Care Coverage Provided by Risk Retention Plans,
269 JAMA 2527 (1993) (indicating the need to modify the ERISA preemption clause); Vicki
Gottlich, ERISA Preemption: A Stumbling Block to State Health Care Reform, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1469 (1993) (detailing the pervasiveness of the ERISA preemption
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Thus, true reform of the U.S. health insurance market first requires reform of ERISA.
When Congress conceived and enacted ERISA in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the debate focused on the security of employee pension
benefits. During that period, several factors influenced the call for
regulatory oversight of employee benefits. First, private pensions grew
dramatically after World War II. Between 1945 and 1984, the number
of workers covered by private pension and employee benefit plans increased from 6.4 million to 65 million, and the value of these plans increased from $5.4 billion in assets to over $900 billion. 4 Second, the
workforce shifted from an industrialized to a post-industrialized job
base, 5 while labor unions remained concerned with protecting the benefits achieved under the industrialized system. 6 In this climate of
changing work bases, increased emphasis on governmental support in
retirement, and increased health costs, Congress began to consider employee benefit regulation. The resulting text of ERISA clearly suggests
that Congress' objective in creating the Act was to protect pension plans
through tightly structured administrative requirements.
By the end of the 1960s, nearly all working, non-elderly Americans
obtained health care coverage through employment. 7 This increase in
private, employer-based coverage, along with the inauguration of the

clause); Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Employer-Provided Health Insurance-The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and Health Care Reform, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682 (1992)
(explaining the need for a national system that would provide universal access to health care).
4. See Daniel W. Sherrick, ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MICH. B.J. 1074, 1074
(1985) (citing DANIEL M. HOLLAND, PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS: PROJECTED GROWTH 2 (1966);
F.X. Lilly, Lecture at the Institute of Labor Law (October 18-19, 1984), in THE SOUTHWEST
LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 9.06 (1985)).
5. See John R. Keville, Note, Retire At Your Own Risk: ERISA 's Return on Investment?, 68
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527, 531 (1994) (citing ROBERT J. LYNN, THE PENSION CRISES 26, 26-27
(1983)). The industrialized workforce was predominantly blue-collar and labor unions often
protected its concerns. See id. at 531-32. The post-industrial workforce is characterized by a decreased emphasis on blue collar employment and substantial increases in white collar work, particularly in service areas such as health care, insurance, banking, finance, government, transportation, and hotel and restaurant work. See id. at 532 n.24. Between 1948 and 1974, the average
number of private wage and salary workers in service areas increased 150% to 200% annually.
See id.
6. See id. at 532 (citing David Langer, Protector Becomes the Threat to Pensions, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, Sept. 14, 1992, at 15). For example, in 1964, the United Auto Workers and the
United Steelworkers of America, two large unions representing weakening industries and members with depleted or at-risk pension benefits, began lobbying Congress for federal pension protection. See id. at 532 n.26.
7. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical Development and Choicesfor the 1990's, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 148 (1993).
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Medicare 8 and Medicaid 9 programs in the late 1960s precipitated a dramatic rise in health care expenditures. 10 As a result, in order to control
the rising cost of employee benefits and to escape the state mandated
requirements, employers began to self-insure employee welfare benefits
for health coverage.I
Several reforms in health care coverage amended ERISA and improved the protections available to employee-welfare plan participants
and beneficiaries. For instance, in 1985, Congress mandated extended
coverage to employees and family members upon termination of employment or other threats to health coverage access. 12 More recently,
health reform legislation further amended ERISA by enacting specific
reforms, including health insurance portability, 13 mandated post-natal
hospital stays, 14 and mandated mental health benefit limitations. 15
These changes to health care coverage indicate ERISA's potential as
a tool for genuine health care reform. This potential is particularly farreaching because ERISA provides a framework in which federal
authority over most health plans for the non-elderly already exists. Unfortunately, ERISA reform amendments to date have been piecemeal
and characterized by consumer-driven attempts to resolve problems by
attracting media attention. 16 Nevertheless, ERISA's structure offers
greater opportunity for more comprehensive and coordinated reform,
should the political will develop to exploit this opportunity.

8. Congress enacted Medicare in 1965 as the "Health Insurance for the Aged" portion of the
Social Security Act. See SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPP. 75 (1993).
This federal program provides hospital insurance and supplemental medical insurance for the
aged and disabled who are insured under social security. See id.
9. Medicaid is a joint state and federal program to provide health insurance benefits to eligible
persons with limited income and resources. See id.
10. See id. at 150.
11. See PATRICIA BUTLER & KARL POLZER, PRIVATE-SECTOR HEALTH COVERAGE
VARIATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTIONS UNDER ERISA AND STATE LAW 6-8 (1996); Gail A.

Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, The Erosion of Purchased Health Insurance, 25 INQUIRY 328, 329
(1988).
12. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (discussing recent amendments to ERISA,
including COBRA, and the difficulty in enforcing the statute).
13. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text (explaining how the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") deals with pre-existing conditions).
14. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (explaining the Newborns' and Mothers'
Health Protection Act ("NMHPA")).
15. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (describing the Mental Health Parity Act).
16. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (describing the limited success of health
care reform proposals).
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This article reviews the current regulation of private health insurance
benefits at the state and federal level. 17 This article then reviews the
protections envisioned by Congress and the effectiveness of ERISA in
providing uniformity in the insurance industry. 18 Finally, this article
proposes changes to improve ERISA's regulation of employersponsored health insurance. 19 These proposed changes should provide
greater uniformity and consistency for the insurance industry, while
creating a uniform means of assuring that health insurance beneficiaries
are provided reasonable protection of their employee benefits.
II.

THE REGULATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE

Most non-elderly Americans receive insurance through their employment through so-called "employer-sponsored" plans.20 In 1995,
ERISA health plans covered approximately 114 million non-elderly
Americans, insuring 44% of the U.S. population. 2 1 State insurance
codes regulate most of these employer-sponsored plans because these
plans were funded through insurance plans that employers purchase
from commercial insurers.2 2 "Self-insured" plans,23 where the employer directly funds the plan, cover a substantial number of people-at
least 40% of ERISA-covered participants or forty-four million people
(seventeen percent of the population).2 4 The number of people covered
by these self-insured plans, however, appears to be increasing, especially among smaller employers. 25 In addition, employers increasingly
17.
18.
19.

See infra Parts lI.A-B.
See infra Parts Il.C, HI.A-B.
See infra Part IV.

20. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND
CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 2 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED

HEALTH PLANS]. An estimated 76% of private full-time employees are insured through employment. See id. Only 60% of this group is covered by any kind of employer-funded retirement or
savings plan. See id. Further, in 1990, medical benefits constituted an estimated 9.9% of total
payroll. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. In a self-insured (also called a self-funded) plan, the employer absorbs some or all of the
risk of paying claims submitted for health care expenses and does not purchase a commercial insurance product to protect against this risk. See Jensen & Gabel, supra note 11, at 328-29.
24.

See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 20, at 2-3. But

see Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of
Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997) (suggesting that over 65% of employers self-insure, covering about half of the nation's workforce).
25. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 20, at 3 (citing
research that suggests that between 1990 and 1992 the increase in self-insuring for employers
with fewer than 100 employees jumped 4%-from 28% to 32%); see also infra Part II.A (describing self-insured benefit plans).
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purchase health coverage for their employer-sponsored plans from
Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") and other Managed Care
Organizations ("MCOs"). Indeed, approximately 75% of participants in
plans are currently enrolled in some type of manemployer-sponsored
26
plan.
care
aged
A.

State Regulation of Insurance

Inherent police power accords states the authority to protect consumers in various ways. Included within this authority is the regulation of
insurance. Historically, states have actively regulated insurance by addressing solvency and market conduct of insurance companies. 27 The
unique state regulation of insurance evolved in from an 1868 U.S. Supreme Court decision that definitively ruled that insurance was not a
transaction in interstate commerce. 28 In 1940, however, the New Deal
Supreme Court altered this 1868 holding when the U.S. Department of
Justice brought a suit against an interstate rating bureau. In this suit, the
Court determined that insurance was a transaction in interstate commerce and ruled that the federal antitrust laws applied to the insurance
industry. 29 Eager to continue the existing system for state regulations, a
coalition of states, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), 30 and the insurance industry persuaded Congress to enact
26. See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the
1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125, 125 (1997).
27. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
States traditionally regulate the insurer through laws that govern solvency or the qualifications for
management; laws regulating aspects of transacting business, including claims practices or rates;
and laws regulating the content of group policies, such as mandated benefits, grace periods, and
conversion privileges. See id. at 728 n.2 (citing Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57, 81-84, 101 (1976)).
28. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), overruled in part by United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); BANKS McDOWELL, THE CRISIS IN
INSURANCE REGULATION 39-41 (1994).
29. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944).
30. The NAIC, a non-profit organization founded in 1871, plays an important role in supporting the work of state insurance regulators. See The NAIC: A Tradition of Consumer Protection
(visited Feb. 1999) <http://www.naic.org > [hereinafter NAIC: A Tradition of Consumer Protection]. Comprised of state and territorial insurance commissioners, the NAIC effectively coordinates state regulation through model laws and regulations and technical assistance to state insurance departments. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS,
AND GUIDELINES (1998) [hereinafter NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS]; see
also How Insurance Laws are Made: The NAIC and State Adoption of NAIC Model Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Bus. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991). The NAIC provides regulators a common forum in which to address regulatory problems and to develop solutions. See id. In 1989, the NAIC accreditation
program required accredited state insurance regulation programs to enact many NAIC model
laws, particularly for solvency regulation. See KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which substantially shielded the insurance
industry from the federal antitrust law in states that regulated insur31
ance.
1.

State Regulation of Health Insurance

States have historically regulated health insurance companies that operate within their territorial boundaries. State regulation of health insurance generally addresses solvency of the insurer and consumer protec32
tion issues in rate setting, underwriting, and market behavior.
Importantly, the NAIC has proposed model statutes for the regulation of
health insurers 33 and HMOs. 34 Recent state regulations of health insurance offered protection for consumers by mandating minimum benefits
35
and controlling the practices used to select and insure participants.
a. Mandated Benefits
36
Many states mandate specific benefits for health insurance plans.
Specifically, sixteen states mandate over twenty kinds of benefits; eight
37 Common treatment-related benefits 38
others mandate as many as ten.
INSURANCE REGULATION 161-63 (1995); see also The NAIC: A Tradition of Consumer Protection, supra. Thus, many states have similar insurance laws and regulation programs because
nearly all states are accredited with the NAIC. See ETrLINGER ET AL., supra, at 161-63.
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1014 (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act places the power to
regulate insurance clearly in the hands of the "several States." Specifically,
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the Several States of
the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.
15 U.S.C. § 1011.
Further,
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unlike such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance.
15 U.S.C. § 1012.
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing traditional areas of state regulation);
see also ETTLINGER ET AL., supra note 30, at 161-63.
33. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, supra note 30, at Vols. I and
II.
34. See id. at § 430-1.
35. See infra Parts II.A.I (explaining state mandated health insurance benefits and the reform
attempts to health insurance plans).
36. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF
INSURANCE 9 (1996).
37. See id.
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include mammography screening, 39 alcoholism treatment, n° mental illness, 4 1 well child care,4 2 drug abuse treatment, 43 pap smear,an infertility
treatment and in vitro fertilization, 45 temporomandibular joint disorders, 4 6 off-label drug use, 4 7 maternity care,4 8 and post-mastectomy
breast reconstruction. 49 Some states limit these mandates to particular
types of health plans, such as HMOs or group insurance plans. 50 Mandated benefits, however, can make health insurance more expensive
to self-insure in order to
and, thus, have been an incentive for employers
51
mandates.
these
with
compliance
avoid
b. Small Market Reform
Beginning in the 1980s, the health insurance market became more
competitive. 52 As a result, state-regulated health insurance companies
engaged in underwriting practices that threatened the availability and
affordability of health insurance for both those who obtained health insurance through employment and those who purchased health insurance
individually. 53 To address these problems, states enacted a number of

38. See id. app. IV, at 33 (citing NAIC, COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS ON INSURANCE
TOPICS: MANDATED BENEFITS (1995)).
39. See id. Forty-two states require insurance plans to cover these benefits, and four require
insurance plans to offer these benefits. See id.
40. See id. Twenty-three states require coverage of these benefits, and sixteen require insurance plans to offer these benefits. See id.
41. See id. Fifteen states require insurance plans to cover these benefits, and sixteen require
insurance plans to offer these benefits. See id.
42. See id. Twenty-one states require coverage of these benefits, and four require insurance
plans to offer these benefits. See id.
43. See id. Thirteen states require coverage, and ten require insurance plans to offer these
benefits. See id.
44. See id. Seventeen states require this to be covered. See id. None require it to be offered.
See id.
45. See id. Twelve states require coverage, and two require insurance plans to offer these
benefits. See id.
46. See id. Eleven states require coverage, and three require an offer of coverage. See id.
47. See id. Thirteen states require this to be covered. See id. None require it to be offered.
See id.
48. See id. Eleven states require coverage, and two require an offer of coverage. See id.
49. See id. Nine states require coverage, and two require an offer of coverage. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Jon R. Gabel and Gail A. Jensen, The Price of State Mandated Benefits, 26 INQUIRY
419, 419 (1989); see also BUTLER & POLZER, supra note 11, at 25-36.
52. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 7, at 153.
53. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Serious Illness and PrivateHealth Coverage: A Unique
Problem Calling for Unique Solutions, 25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 180 (1997); Donald W. Light,
Life, Death, and the Insurance Companies, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498 (1994); Donald W. Light,
The Practiceand Ethics of Risk-Related Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503 (1992); Deborah A.
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measures to prevent restrictive underwriting practices and to ensure
both the portability of health insurance coverage and the stability of insurance costs for people with serious health conditions who were affected by these practices. 54 ERISA severely hampers these efforts because it allows employers to self-insure in order to completely avoid
state insurance regulations. 55 In response to this problem, Congress enAct
acted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
56
reforms.
market
insurance
nationwide
provides
which
("HIPAA"),
2. State Efforts to Reform Managed Care
NAIC 57

The
recently proposed model legislation to strengthen the
state regulation of health insurance. The NAIC has also become quite
active in the regulation of managed care plans, including many of the
new risk-bearing entities 58 that emerged in the 1990s. 59 Specifically,
the NAIC recently launched its "CLEAR" initiative6 0 to reform state
regulation of all managed care plans. 6 1 The "CLEAR" initiative endeavored to "increase the use of common definitions and promote uniform regulation of health plans." 62 The initiative included five model

Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 287
(1993); Wendy Zellers et al., Small-Business Health Insurance: Only the Healthy Need Apply, 11
HEALTH AFF. 174 (1992).
54. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY: REFORM COULD ENSURE
CONTINUED COVERAGE FOR UP To 25 MILLION AMERICANS (1995); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
VARIATION IN RECENT STATE SMALL EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM (1995); Alpha
Center, 1996 State Legislative Sessions: InsuranceMarket RestructuringLeads State Agendas, 16
STATE INITIATIVES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 1(1996).
55. See infra notes 170-95 and accompanying text (describing the development of self-insured
plans). These self-insurance plans do not fall within ERISA's savings clause exception and, thus,
are not subject to state regulation. See infra Part III.A (discussing ERISA's preemption of state
regulations attempting to govern self-insurance plans).
56. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text (discussing HIPAA).
57. See supra note 30 (discussing the role of NAIC in accrediting state insurance regulations).
58. The business of insurance is managing and spreading risk. As the Supreme Court has
noted "[tihe primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a
policyholder's risk." Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers that Bear
Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 369 (1996) (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)).
59. See Health Care Quality and Consumer Protection:Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 23 (1997) [hereinafter Health Care Quality and
Consumer Protection] (testimony of Kathleen Sebelius, National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
60. CLEAR stands for "Consolidated Licensure for Entities Assuming Risk."
61. See Health Care Quality and Consumer Protection, supra note 59, at 24 (testimony of
Kathleen Sebelius, National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
62. Id. at 72 (statement of Kathleen Sebelius, National Association of Insurance Commission-
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statutes that address the following various types of health plans: Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy, Health Carrier Grievance Procedure, Utilization Review, Quality Assessment and Improvement, and
Health Care Professional Credentialing Verification. 63 These model
statutes would impose basic quality standards upon managed care health
plans and sponsoring carriers to protect consumers who are either: (1)
restricted as to their choice of provider; or (2) offered incentives to se64
lect a particular provider.
In addition to the NAIC, the states have become active in the regulation of health insurance. Specifically, states have recently begun to
mandate protections for consumers in HMOs. Some states moved to
enact consumer protections into state HMO statutes, including such
things as stronger disclosure requirements and a less restrictive utilization review. 65 ERISA, however, may preempt these state reform laws to
the extent that they impose obligations on employee welfare benefit
66
plans.
B. FederalRegulation of Health Insurance
ERISA federally regulates private health insurance 67 within the following three basic categories of regulation: (1) regulation of plan ad69
ministration; 68 (2) enforcement of plan requirements and remedies;
and (3) substantive mandates. 70 Administration provisions regulate, for
example, the reporting and disclosure provisions as well as the procedures and standards of conduct for fiduciaries. Enforcement provisions
establish the right to review plan decisions made on behalf of beneficiaries and participants and provide remedies for breach of the contractual
relationship. Substantive mandates define required benefits or other

63. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, supra note 30.
64. See Health Care Quality and Consumer Protection, supra note 59, at 67 (testimony of
Kathleen Sebelius, National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
65. See Health Care Quality: Grievance Procedures: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 46-69 (1998); Families, USA, The Text of Key State
HMO Consumer Protection Provisions: The Best From the States (visited March 5, 1998)
<http://familiesusa.org/hmostate.html>; see also I GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS IN STATE HMO LAWS (1995).
66. See Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (holding that ERISA preempts state efforts to reform managed care); see also infra Part
II.C (discussing federal preemption of state insurance regulation).
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
68. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing ERISA's regulation of plan administration).
69. See infra Part II.B.2 (addressing ERISA provisions for enforcement of plan requirements
and remedies).
70. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing ERISA's substantive mandates).
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terms of insurance contracts. Although ERISA contains extensive administrative provisions, it contains very few substantive mandates.
Furthermore, the mechanisms for enforcement of these provisions are
limited, although recent amendments to ERISA have added a small
number of substantive provisions that mandate specified benefits.
1. Regulation of Plan Administration
The administrative provisions fall into the following two basic categories: (1) reporting and disclosure rules, 71 and (2) fiduciary standards.7 2 Under the reporting and disclosure rules, plan administrators
must disclose a summary plan description to participants and beneficiaries. 7 3 In addition, the administrators must disseminate plan information that is written "in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant" and "sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise [the] participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
obligations under the plan." 74 This part of ERISA is highly detailed and
75
provides clear guidelines to the plan administrators.
The rules pertaining to fiduciary standards are less detailed, but
equally clear. These rules require the fiduciary to discharge his duties
with respect to the plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries. 76 These rules also require fiduciaries to act exclusively

71. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1021-31 (West 1999).
72. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994 & Supp. II1996).
73. See id. § 1021(a).
74. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1022(a).
75. For example, ERISA requires the administrator to prepare and provide substantial information to beneficiaries and participants upon written request. Among other things, administrators
are required to disclose information such as whether a health insurance issuer is responsible for
financing and administrating the plan and the name and address of the issuer; the names and addresses of agents for service of legal process; a description of relevant provisions of applicable
collective bargaining agreements; requirements for eligibility for participation and benefits; circumstances which may result in disqualification; and the procedures to be followed in presenting
claims for benefits as well as the procedures to seek assistance or information from the Department of Labor regarding their rights under ERISA. See id. § 1022(b).
76. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Russell, the Supreme Court addressed fiduciary obligations under ERISA. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134 (1985). The Court found that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 409(a) did
not support a private remedy for breach of fiduciary duty, but instead were intended only for protection of the whole plan and not the individuals. See id. at 142, 145-47. Justice Brennan's concurrence, however, applied traditional trust law to argue that equitable relief is available to beneficiaries as a remedy for ERISA violations under § 502(a)(3). See id. at 151-53 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). This concurrence paves the way for lower courts to allow individual recovery under
§ 502(a)(3). See Shelley L. Ward, Enlarging an Employer's FiduciaryHat: Varity Corp. v. Howe
Increases Employers' Exposure to Liability When They Act as ERISA Fiduciaries,34 HOUS. L.
REV. 1195, 1205-06 (1997).
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for the purpose of "providing benefits to participants and their benefici77
aries" and "to defray reasonable expenses of administering the plan."
The rules impose a standard of care requiring the fiduciary to act with
the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person in like
capacity would use. 78 Additionally, ERISA outlines the fiduciary's duties upon termination of the health care plan, 79 the insurer's role in the
fiduciary relationship, and the plan's liability for acts of the fiduciary or
80
the insurer.
2.

Enforcement of Plan Requirements

ERISA is enforced through civil actions. 81 Section 502(a) of ERISA
contains a civil enforcement scheme. 82 This is the exclusive remedy for
improper processing of claims and preempts all state causes of action
for claims within its scope. 83 Under Section 502(a), plan participants or
beneficiaries may sue plans directly to recover benefits owed or to enforce other rights under the plan. 84 ERISA also authorizes civil actions
against plan fiduciaries for breaches of ERISA requirements and to recover benefits due. 85 Courts may review plan fiduciary determinations
de novo.86 Plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries may also
87
seek equitable relief for violations of ERISA requirements.
When plaintiffs bring a suit under Section 502(a), courts have discretion to award attorney's fees to either party. 88 The Supreme Court,
however, declined to extend the damages provisions to include punitive
damages, noting that when a congressional enactment includes procedures for enforcement, a presumption exists that Congress89 intentionally
omitted any remedy not specifically included in the statute.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
78. Id. § 1104(a)(l)(B).
79. See id. § 1104(d).
80. Seeid.§ 1101.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994); see also Richard Rouco, Comment, Available Remedies
Under ERISA Section 502(A), 45 ALA. L. REV. 631, 634 (1994) (summarizing the civil actions
available under section 502(a) and their corresponding remedies).
82. Section 502(a) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
83. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempts
state law claims of improper processing of a claim for benefits).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(1).
85. See id. § 1132(a)(2).
86. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding that federal
district courts have de novo review under section 503 for plan denials rather than review under an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard).
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
88. See id. § 1132(g)(1).
89. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life
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Commentators argue that ERISA's remedies are deficient because of
the manner in which the federal courts often apply ERISA. They argue
that this application often results in the denial of full recovery of damages for plan participants. 9° Indeed, commentators suggest that the federal courts' application of ERISA contravenes the express congressional
intent of the statute, which is to protect insurance beneficiaries. 9 1 It is
in the context of these judicial interpretations that ERISA's shortcomings become most apparent. For example, although plan fiduciaries
must discharge their duties with the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits, 92 judicial review of a denial of benefits is often highly deferential and applies an "arbitrary and capricious" standard, under which
courts accept the plan administrator's interpretation of ambiguous plan
terms. 93 Furthermore, courts generally deny participants the opportu94
nity to recover extra-contractual damages and rarely award legal fees.
Recent amendments to ERISA provide clearer guidelines for conduct
when implementing eligibility requirements and employer plans. For
example, plans may not discriminate against individuals due to health
status, 95 nor may they deny continued access to coverage for an employer participating in a multi-employer plan without good cause, as
specified in the statute. 96 Health care plans, however, may delay performance of their duties and force beneficiaries into court to receive
contractual benefits. Therefore, even though Congress substantially
improved ERISA by defining prohibited conduct in the context of eligibility requirements and employment plans, its failure to set appropriate
penalties perpetuates the harm caused by ERISA's prior deficiencies.
Some provisions give the Secretary of Labor the authority to seek relief for failure to follow ERISA's administrative procedures (e.g., filing

Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981))).
90. See BUTLER AND POLZER, supra note 11, at 47; see also infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in ERISA's remedies provisions).
91. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 959-60 (1995).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
93. See Flint, supra note 91, at 960 (citing Smith v. California Metal Trades Assoc. - Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1978)).
94. See id. at 961 (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146
(1985) (providing dicta for the benefits due lawsuit)); see also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 46465 (10th Cir. 1978).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
96. See id. § 1183 (setting forth various reasons for which a group health plan may keep continued access to certain coverage).
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reports on time); however, the Secretary cannot seek relief if the plan
fails to meet other ERISA requirements. 97 Indeed, the Secretary of Labor has no authority to enforce the new substantive provisions that
mandate certain types of benefits. 98 Therefore, each harmed individual
must bring an independent claim seeking only the authorized equitable
relief, while the Department of Labor, vested with authority to regulate,
can do nothing to enforce its own regulations to protect beneficiaries.
3.

Substantive Regulation of Health Plans

Historically, ERISA only minimally regulated the terms of employersponsored health plans. Beginning in 1985, however, Congress imposed federal requirements on employer-sponsored health plans in order
to address specific problems with the private health insurance market.
This substantive regulation demonstrates ERISA's potential as a vehicle
99
of health system reform.
a. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
("COBRA") amended both the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and
ERISA to include continuation coverage requirements for employerprovided group health plans.100 Under COBRA, group health plans
must make coverage available to employees and dependents who might
otherwise lose their benefits due to changes in employment or job
status.' 0' Regardless of whether the plan is insured or self-insured,
COBRA requires continuation of "core benefits" under any group health
plan that furnishes medical care benefits for employees and their dependents unless the plan is a governmental, church or small employer
plan. 10 2 At termination of employment, employers must apprise employees of their COBRA rights and provide a specified time in which to
elect continued coverage under the plan. 10 3 Failure to comply with

97. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 132(b)-(c) (West 1999).
98. See id. § 1132(b)(2) (denying authority to sue for violations of section 515, codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1145).
99. See infra Part IV (discussing ERISA's potential to reform the health care system).
100. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); see also Deborah Shelby Nichols,
COBRA and Other Health Care Issues, in ALI-ABA Course of Study Basic Law of Pensions,
Welfare Plans, and Deferred Compensation 1029, 1031 (ALI-ABA pub., July 8-12, 1996) (discussing the background and requirements of COBRA).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1163 (1994).
102. See id. § 1003(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
103. See id. § 1166.
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COBRA may result in tax penalties as well as liability for payment of
benefits that might not otherwise be required. 10 4
b. Health InsurancePortabilityandAccountability Act of 1996
HIPAA 10 5 is a notable amendment to ERISA because it provides for
increased portability of insurance through limitations on pre-existing
condition exclusions. 10 6 This amendment applies to limitations or exclusions of coverage based upon a condition that was present before the
date of enrollment for coverage, regardless of whether any medical
treatment or diagnosis occurred prior to the date of enrollment. Under
HIPAA, limitations may only be imposed upon conditions for which an
employee sought or received medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment during the six months immediately preceding the enrollment date.
Furthermore, the plan may only impose exclusions or limitations for
twelve months 10 7 after the date of enrollment, 10 8 thereby providing employees greater flexibility to change jobs without fear of losing insurance coverage for themselves or their dependents.
Another protective provision of HIPAA prohibits eligibility decisions
based upon factors such as health status, medical condition (including
mental illness), claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or disability. 10 9 This
provision does not require the plan to provide additional coverage nor
does it prevent limitations or restrictions on amount, level, or nature of
benefits or coverage, provided that such restrictions are applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 110 It does, however, prohibit higher premiums or contributions based on health-status factors.' 1 ' HIPAA also
limits acceptable reasons for denying an employee continued or different coverage (as defined by the contract)' 12 and essentially precludes a

104. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (West 1999).
105. See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing HIPAA).
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (Supp. II 1996).
107. See id. § 1181(a)(2). In the case of a late enrollee, exclusions or limitations may be imposed for eighteen months after the date of enrollment, if the late enrollee enrolls under a plan at
some time other than during the first period in which the enrollee is eligible to enroll under the
plan, or during a special enrollment period. See id. § 1181(a)(2), (b)(3).
108. See id. § 1181(a)(2). Creditable coverage means coverage of the individual under any of
the types of medical coverage enumerated in the section, including group health plans, health insurance, or certain state or federal government-sponsored plans. See id. § 1181 (c)(1).
109. See id. § 1182(a)(1).
110. See id. § 182(a)(2).
t11. See id. § 1182(b)(1).
112. See id. § 1183. Any of the following reasons may terminate coverage: nonpayment,
fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material fact by the employer, noncompliance with ma-

1999]

The Road Paved with Good Intentions

plan from excluding coverage of certain types of claims once an employee has presented them.
c. MandatedBenefits
In 1996, two other acts amended ERISA by requiring coverage for
mental health benefits and mother-child care. First, the Mental Health
Parity Act of 19961 13 requires that any aggregate lifetime limit within
the plan language either: (1) apply without distinction as to type of
benefit (e.g., medical, surgical, or mental health); or (2) apply a limit on4
mental health benefits that is equivalent to limits on 5other benefits.''
The same standards apply to annual limits on benefits."
Second, the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996
("NMHPA")1 6 requires coverage of hospital stays of at least forty-eight
hours after a normal vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a cesarean section. 117 The NMHPA prohibits denials of eligibility in order to
avoid the requirements and prohibits monetary payments or rebates that
encourage mothers to accept lesser protections. 118 The NMPHA also
prohibits: (1) reduction or limitation of payments to the medical providers who comply with the NMPHA; 119 (2) monetary or other incentives
to providers who do not comply with the statute; and (3) differences in
20
benefits over the course of the stay. 1
d. FailedReform Attempts
Congress considered, but declined to adopt, several amendments that
would have rectified problems in current ERISA interpretation. 12 1 For
example, one proposed amendment would have preserved state law

terial provisions, the plan's decision to cease offering any coverage within the geographic area,
the absence of any employee who lives, resides or works in the service area of the network plan,
and failure to meet the terms of an applicable collective bargaining agreement. See id.
113. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § I185a (Supp. I 1996)).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 185a(a)(l)(A)-(B) (Supp. 11 1996).
115. See id.
116. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2935 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. II 1996)).
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)(A) (Supp. H 1996). The provision does not apply where the
attending provider, in consultation with the mother, determines to discharge her from the hospital
at an earlier time. See id.
118. See id. § 1185(b).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Flint, supra note 91, at 964-65.
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remedies against insurance companies. 122 Another would have created
federal procedures and judicial remedies for the improper handling of
claims by welfare plans.' 2 3 Yet another would have removed health
care plans from ERISA established new procedures, administrative
124
hearings, and judicial review for the protection of plan beneficiaries.
More recently, the 105th Congress considered, but did not pass, serious reform of ERISA. 125 Although tabled just before the 1998 election,
all of the proposed bills addressed, in some manner, required disclosures regarding benefits and coverage, utilization review, and quality
improvement. 126 The proposed bills also emphasized appeal procedures
and would have imposed extensive requirements on grievance and appeal procedures, particularly in emergency situations. 127 The 106th

122. See id. at 965. Two bills, the Health Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1991 and the
Health Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1993, would have exempted from preemption state laws
that allowed workers to sue insurance companies for compensatory and punitive damages arising
from unfair claims practices. They would not provide similar exemptions for claims against plan
sponsors. See id. at 965 n.45.
123. See id. at 965. The Health Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1993, H.R. 1881, 103d
Cong. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Howard Berman), would:
(1) add a specified time frame for processing claims, (2) permit mediation to resolve
claim disputes, (3) allow federal action for actual damages, including compensatory
and consequential damages, caused by violation of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA
plan, (4) permit recovery of punitive damages against certain parties in case of fraud,
and (5) require an award of attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs.
Id. at 965 n.46.
124. See id. at 965. President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd
Cong. (1993), would:
(1) establish time limits for claims processing and plan review procedures of denials,
(2) permit aggrieved claimants to elect alternative dispute resolution, plan administration hearings, or court remedies, (3) establish the National Health Board to review plan
administrative decisions with appeals to the circuit courts for amounts in excess of
$10,000, and (4) establish substantial civil penalties for wrongful denial or delay of
claims.
Id. at 965 n.47.
125. The proposed reform legislation included President Clinton's Health Insurance Consumer's Bill of Rights Act of 1997, H.R. 2967, S. 1499, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced by Rep.
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.)). The major viable Democratic reform proposal was the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998, H.R. 3605, S. 1890, 105th Cong.,
(1998) (introduced by Sen. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Rep. John H. Dingell (D-Mich.)).
The major Republican bill was the Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 2330, 105th Cong., (1998) (introduced by Sen. Don Nickels (R-Okla.)). Other proposal reforms included: Patient Access to
Responsible Care Act of 1997, H.R. 1415, S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Rep. Charlie Norwood (R-Ga.) and Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.)); Patient Protection Act of 1998,
H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced by Rep. Newton Gingrich (R-Ga.)).
126. See Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar, Senate Kills 'Patients' Rights' Bill, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al.
127. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (citing the proposed reform bills that required disclosure of available grievance and appeal procedures).
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Congress has fitfully begun consideration of new legislation. 128 It remains to be seen, however, whether the 106th Congress will be more
successful than the 105th in reforming ERISA.
C.

FederalPreemptionof State Regulation

ERISA expressly preempts state law that might otherwise govern
employee benefit plans; however, the preemption is not total in that it
permits the states to exercise some continued regulatory power. 129 Specifically, ERISA contains three provisions which, together, preempt
state law: (1) the preemption clause; 130 (2) the savings clause; 13 1 and (3)
the deemer clause. 132 Given these three clauses, the scope of state
regulatory powers might aptly be characterized as "ERISA taketh away;
ERISA giveth; ERISA taketh away again." First, the preemption clause
eliminates the states' power to regulate by preempting any state laws
that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.' 33 The savings clause, however, restores state power to regulate if the state law "regulates insurance, banking, or securities."' 134 Finally, the deemer clause limits this
restored state power by prohibiting states from bringing an employee
benefit plan within the scope of regulation by calling it an "insurance

128. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Curbs on Managed Care Still Divide Two Parties,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1999, at A18 (noting that unresolved issues that divided the two parties in the past
threaten to inhibit any new attempts at legislation); James Jeffords, Three Goalsfor Health Care
Reform in 1999, THE HILL, Jan. 20, 1999, at 30 (highlighting health care issues on the agenda of
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, and indicating a need for solutions instead of finger-pointing).
129. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 3; Farrell, supra note 3; Karen A. Jordan, ERISA Preemption: Integrating Fabe Into the Savings Clause Analysis, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 273 (1996); Karen
A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1149 (1998); Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry:
An Abdication of JudicialLaw-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355 (1994); Lawrence Allen
Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation:
Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV.
607 (1989).
130. The preemption clause states, "Except as provided in [the savings clause] ... [ERISA]
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan.
." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
131. The savings clause provides, "[N]othing-in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt
or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
132. The deemer clause provides, "Neither an employee benefit plan... nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be
engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts... " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
133. See id. § 1144(a).
134. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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company or other insurer." 135 Despite the limited exemptions of the
savings clause, the sweeping language of ERISA preempts most state
laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. 136 Thus, ERISA generally
provides the exclusive remedy when a claim is presented under an em37
ployee benefit plan. 1
Although the ERISA preemption is sweeping, the savings clause creates a loophole that allows states to protect their citizens' interests
through regulation of health plans. 138 For example, the Supreme Court
held that ERISA did not preempt a state law that required a minimum
level of mental health benefits. 139 The law in question clearly "related
to" welfare benefit plans under the Court's broad common-sense approach to its meaning. The Court, however, found that the statute was
under the savings clause's
not preempted because it regulated insurance
14
exception for the "business of insurance."' 0
1. Legislative History
The corresponding legislative history, or lack thereof, of ERISA's
preemption clause is astounding. As one participant noted retrospectively, the resulting regulatory vacuum was not deeply considered during the years of planning, negotiating, and drafting the bill. 14 1 The
ERISA bills initially contained language that merely prevented the
states from enacting legislation concerning subject matters regulated by
ERISA;142 thus, the bills prohibited only direct conflicts in the law. The
Conference Committee scrapped this more limited preemption clause
and adopted the present, broader language, just before ERISA's enactment. 143 The language added during the final negotiations, and dis135. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). For example, an employer who establishes a trust fund to pay its
employees' medical claims (a self-insured plan) cannot be deemed an insurer for purposes of state
regulation. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
136. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987) (stating that "the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive"); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (stating that "[tihe breadth of [the clause's] preemptive reach is apparent... ").
137. See JAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN & MARK E. SCHMIDTKE, ERISA LITIGATION PRIMER 9
(1992).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
139. See Metropolitan Life Ins., Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985).
140. See id. at 742-44.
141. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and
Semipreemption, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y, & L. 239, 248 (1989).
142. See id. at 241 (citing H.R. 2, 93d Cong., § 699(a) (1974) (as amended by Senate)).
143. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983) (referencing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974); S.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1090, at 383 (1974))).
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closed only ten days before Congress' final action, was the result of
strong opinions of House conferees who spoke on behalf of powerful
interest groups. 144 The new language preempted state law relating to
"any employee benefit plan," even if the plan was not regulated by the
Act.' 45 The ERISA Committee Conference Report, however, is silent
with respect to these provisions;1 46 thus, aside from the text of the statute itself, it is difficult to ascertain Congress' precise intent regarding
the scope and significance of the preemption clause.
Some legislators viewed the preemption clause as a means of creating
a more uniform governance of benefits law. 147 Others viewed it as a
"starting point" in regulating insurance. 14 8 For example, in delivering
the Conference Committee Report, Senator Javits indicated the statute's
defined protection would only be successful if the federal courts develcommon law rights and obligations under emoped a body of federal
49
ployee benefit plans. 1

144. The NAIC was a major party to the change in the preemption language, specifically
championing protection for "any law of any State which regulates insurance," consistent with the
traditional arrangement in insurance regulation as expressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Fox & Schaffer, supra note 141, at 242. Organized labor pushed for
preemption of state regulations in order to protect its members from non-uniform regulation, such
as state-mandated benefits, and to prevent interference with national collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 243. Finally, the insurance industry, which clearly would be affected by
ERISA, was, as a whole, ambivalent to the process. See id. For it, preemption of state law
avoided mandates and would make it easier to offer uniform policies to national employers, but
on the other hand, the industry was well-established in the state insurance system. See id. However, smaller insurers, who preferred state regulation, were concerned about competition with
self-insured plans within regional and state markets. See id.
145. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
146. See Congressional Committee of Conference on ERISA Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference on ERISA, in ERISA SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1974-1991,
1, 107 (1992).
147. Indeed, Representative John Dent (R-N.Y.), a sponsor of the bill, referred to the preemption clause as the "crowning achievement of this legislation" because it eliminated the "threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent); see also Fox & Schaffer, supra note 141, at 241 (citing Rep. Dent's debate in
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD).
148. Further, Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), a sponsor of the bill, looked forward to future
refining of the clause, saying that the "desirability of further regulation-at either the State or
Federal level--undoubtedly warrants further attention ... " 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits); see also Fox & Schaffer, supra note 141, at 241-42 (citing Sen. Javits's
debate in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD).
149. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits); see also William K. Carr
& Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need for a Strong Federal Common Law of
ERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 221, 224 (1992/1993) (referencing Congress' mandate that the
federal courts apply common law principles to ERISA cases).
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2. Judicial Interpretation
Due to the dearth of preemption clause legislative history, the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended to give the preemption clause a scope as broad as its language. 150 Congress' failure to revise ERISA in light of this interpretation has effectively ratified the
Court's holding. In arriving at its expansive reading of these provisions,
however, the Court ignored the statements of ERISA's sponsors. These
statements reflect an intent to "round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State
and local regulation."' 15 1 Indeed, one sponsor stated that "with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement
provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field
for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or in' 152
consistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans."
Notwithstanding these statements, the Court, in reaching its conclusions, did not consider whether an actual conflict of laws or inconsistency exists. Clearly, no conflict or inconsistency exists when federal
law does not address an issue. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court consistently allows the preemption clause to foreclose state laws that "relate
to" an employee benefit plan, even when the federal law provides no direct regulation. In so doing, the Court reasoned that preemption is
"compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the stat' 153
ute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."
Thus, the Court has held that ERISA preemption sweeps aside much of
the states' power to regulate health plans.
Despite stated concerns about ERISA's language, the Supreme Court
has also concluded that it is bound by the plain meaning of the statute,
which invokes a broad reading of the preemption clause. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has determined that a "state law 'relates to' . . . [a]
benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan." 154 Since this decision, the Supreme Court has identified four
categories of state laws with sufficient relation to ERISA plans to justify
150. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
151. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), quoted in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
153. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 152-53 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court ... must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
154. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
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preemption: "laws that specifically apply to ERISA plans; laws that impose a duty on ERISA plans by referencing ERISA plans; laws that
mandate specific benefit structures or prohibit a method of determining
that are within the scope of
the level of benefits; or common law actions
155
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions."'
Any state law that applies solely to ERISA plans "relates to" ERISA
plans and is preempted. 156 ERISA, however, does not preempt a state
law when it "relates to" employee benefits, but not to a plan. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring a one-time severance payment to displaced workers because the law, which affected an
employee benefit, did not relate to a plan. 157 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed the plain language of the preemption provision, the purpose of the provision, and the overall objectives of
had
ERISA. 158 The Court found that the words "benefit" and "plan"
59
distinct uses and, therefore, they could not be treated as synonyms. 1
Even when a law relates to a plan, the Court must consider whether
the law "regulate[s] insurance," within the scope of the savings clause
before concluding that ERISA preempts the law. To regulate insurance,
the law must "not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but
must be specifically directed toward that industry."' 16 Moreover, it
must regulate "the business of insurance" as that phrase is specified in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 161 A law regulates the "business of insurance," as contemplated by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, when it meets
these criteria: 'first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or

155. Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Supportfor the Argument to Restrain ERISA
Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255, 263-64 (1996); see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992) (preempting a workers' compensation
provision that was related to ERISA plans); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.,
486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988) (preempting a Georgia statute because it specifically referenced
ERISA); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (preempting state common law
contract claims seeking relief from ERISA's civil enforcement provision); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (preempting state law that mandated specific
benefit structures).
156. See Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 129-31. For instance, a state statute
applies solely to ERISA plans if it bars the garnishment of ERISA plan funds and benefits or
workers' compensation provisions. See id. at 126-27.
157. See Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987). A Maine statute,
which required employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of
a plant closing, was not preempted by ERISA despite the fact that ERISA does cover severance
benefits. See id. at 23.
158. See id. at 7.
159. See id. at 7-8.
160. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
161. 15U.S.C.§§ 1011-1014(1994).
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spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry." 162 A state law must meet all three of these criteria to fall
within the scope of the savings clause and thus avoid preemption by
ERISA. Even if a state law is "saved" by virtue of this analysis, however, it will still be preempted if it attempts to deem an employee benefit plan to be insurance for purposes of the law. 163 Thus, self-insured
164
plans are not subject to state law as a result of the deemer clause.
III.

PROBLEMS IN COORDINATING STATE AND FEDERAL INSURANCE
REGULATION

The problems with the current statutory structure are myriad. One
commentator, summarizing the literature on protection of beneficiaries,
observed that "[e]mployees frequently are cheated out of employerprovided pension, health insurance, and severance pay benefits. The
'1 65
reason is simple: the courts do not construe the law to protect them."
From the state regulators' (and perhaps the beneficiaries') perspective,
the problem with ERISA is not only that it preempts state insurance
regulation, but that it provides no clear alternative to protect consumers.
Indeed, ERISA not only makes federal law primary, it also precludes
state regulation even where federal law is silent. 166 ERISA explicitly
prohibits all state regulation of health insurance, but in its original form
provides no regulation of this employee benefit whatsoever. 167 The resulting "regulatory vacuum" has gone unremedied-both legislatively
and judicially-in the ensuing decades, leaving states powerless to protect their citizens from harm. In many cases, an employee benefit plan
controls who receives treatment and the type of treatment available, and
the regulatory vacuum provides no recourse to citizens who are denied
168
coverage that results in physical detriment or death to the participant.
162. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
164. See id.; infra Part III.A (discussing self-insured benefit plans).
165. Carr & Liebross, supra note 149, at 221, quoted in Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health
Care Claimants: PracticalAssessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST.
L. J. 723, 724 n.5 (1994).
166. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 141, at 240; see also supra notes 129-49 and accompanying
text (discussing ERISA preemption of state insurance law).
167. Recent amendments have addressed some substantive benefits. See supra Part II.B.3
(discussing congressionally imposed mandates on employer-sponsored health plans).
168. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that employee's state tort claims are preempted by ERISA and that extra-contractual damages are
not recoverable under ERISA section 502(a)(3)).
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In its current form, ERISA meets none of the stated legislative goals.
It does not protect beneficiaries because it does not regulate benefits or
guide courts in doing so. Instead of the envisioned uniform national
standards, ERISA indirectly creates inconsistent standards for insurance
companies because judicial interpretations of ERISA have carved out an
169
assortment of seemingly unrelated pockets of state regulation.
A.

Self-Insured Benefit Plans

A self-insured benefit plan is any plan not funded by an insurance
policy. 170 Self-insured plans fall into two categories, depending upon
the extent of risk borne by the employer. First, when an employer assumes all of the risk, the plan is totally self-insured. Second, "[u]nder a
minimum-premium plan, the employer bears the risk up to some stoploss threshold, after which an insurer bears or shares the risk for additional claims." 17 1 In order to be self-insured, the day-to-day administration of the plan must be "the responsibility of the employer, an insurance carrier, a third-party administrator ("TPA"), or a combination of
these." 172 In 1984, for example, employers administered twenty-three
percent of self-insured plans, thereby accounting for sixteen percent of
173
all employees covered by self-insured plans.
States cannot regulate anything that is not within the scope of the

169. Many of the significant Supreme Court cases themselves define exceptions in which
states may regulate. For example, the Supreme Court found that a state law that required a onetime severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing was not a "plan" under
ERISA and therefore was not preempted. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987). The Court has also determined that a statute mandating certain health benefits in all insurance plans was saved from preemption, applying the McCarran-Ferguson definition of business of insurance. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). Creating another loophole in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., the Supreme Court held that state laws are
only preempted insofar as they prohibit practices that are otherwise lawful under federal law.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1983). Thus, a state law designed to assist in
enforcement of federal Title VII rights was not preempted given the importance of state fair employment laws in the Title VII scheme. See id. Similarly, the inconsistency between the circuits
regarding the manner in which partially self-insured plans (those using stop-loss coverage to
protect against catastrophic loss) has created opportunities for some states to regulate while others
are preempted. See supra Part II.B (discussing regulatory framework for employer-sponsored
health insurance under ERISA).
170. See Jensen & Gabel, supra note 11, at 328.
171. Id.at329.
172. Id.
173. See id. (citing a national survey conducted by the Health Care Financing Administration
and described in Patricia McDonell et al., Self-Insured Health Plans, 8 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REVIEW 2 (1986) and Mandex, Inc., Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans: Benchmark
Report (1987) (prepared for Dep't of Health & Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration)).
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"business of insurance," nor can they regulate anything that is not insurance. 174 Due to the deemer clause, states may not characterize an employer funded benefits plan as insurance. 175 Likewise, stop-loss coverage, which is not a commercial health insurance plan, is generally not
subject to state regulation under recent court decisions. 176 Accordingly,
self-insured plans that do not purchase traditional commercial insurance
cannot be regulated.
In FMC Corporation v. Holliday,177 the Supreme Court read the
deemer clause to exempt self-insured ERISA plans from state laws that
regulate insurance within the meaning of the savings clause. The Court
noted that "if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through
regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan
is uninsured, the State may not regulate it." 178 Therefore, the Court reasoned that any power to regulate arises from the contractual nature of
the "business of insurance." Where the plan is self-insured, no third
party contract is in place and, thus, no "business" to regulate exists.
In his dissent to FMC, Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he Court's construction of the statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between
benefit plans that are funded by the employer (self-insured plans) and
those that are insured by regulated insurance companies (insured
plans)."' 179 Lower courts, following FMC, have found that fully selfinsured plans are beyond the states' power to regulate pursuant to the
deemer clause. 180 The Court's interpretation of ERISA thus indirectly
encourages employers to become self-insured in order to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of state laws that might otherwise regulate
their insurance contracts.
Self-insuring is most prevalent among larger employers, but is present in nearly identical percentages across broad occupational categories

174. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing the savings clause).
175. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the deemer clause).
176. See infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing preemption of state laws
regulating stop-loss coverage as insurance).
177. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
178. Id. at 64.
179. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1977); Raimondo v. United Food
and Commercial Workers Unions and Participating Employers Health and Welfare Fund, 1987
WL 7033 (E.D. La. 1987); Kilmer v. Central Counties Bank, 623 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Pa. 1985);
Wheeler v. Furr's Inc., 7 EBC 2102 (N.M. 1986); Dillard v. Teamsters Council 83 Health & Welfare Fund, 6 EBC 2558 (W.D. Va. 1985); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 209 Cal. Rptr.
276 (Cal. App. 3d 1984); Russo v. Boland, 431 N.E.2d 1294 (I11.App. Ct. 1982); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. C. A. Muer Corp., 397 N.W.2d 299 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Hunt v. Sherman,
345 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1984).
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such as professional and administrative workers, technical and clerical
workers, and production workers. 18 1 Recent accounting suggests that
only eleven percent of employees in small firms (100 or fewer employees) were covered by self-insured plans, while thirty-four percent of
employees in moderate-size firms (101 to 500 employees) and sixtythree percent in large firms (over 500 employees) were covered by selfinsured plans. 182 In fact, enrollment in self-insured plans among medium and large private sector employers nearly doubled between 1981
and 1985.183 Even among small firms, however, self-insuring for employers with fewer than 100 employees increased by four percent between 1990 and 1992.184 Many state regulators fear that ready availability will lead to the purchase of stop-loss insurance which assumes
most of the risk. They argue that this stop-loss insurance should there85
fore be subject to state health insurance laws.1
The well-publicized case of McGann v. H.& H. Music Co.'8 6 illustrated the potential effect of this trend toward self-insuring. 187 In
McGann, an employer dramatically reduced lifetime benefits for employees with AIDS-related illnesses after discovering an employee had
AIDS. 188 The employer eluded liability for the benefits reduction even
though the employer admitted that its knowledge of the employee's illness prompted the reduction. 189 Because the original contract allowed
termination or amendment of the plan by the sponsor, 190 the employer
avoided liability by simply changing from an insured health plan to a
self-insured plan, which took the plan outside the scope of the savings

181. See Jensen & Gabel, supra note 11, at 331.
182.

See U.S. GEN.

ACCT. OFF., VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF

INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 4.
183. See Jensen & Gabel, supra note 11, at 331.
184. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS, supra note 20, at 3.
185.

See U.S. GEN.

ACCT. OFF., VARYING

STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF

INSURANCE, supra note 36, at 4. Maryland and Missouri enacted regulations embodying the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) stop-loss model act which defines the
levels of risk that a stop-loss carrier may assume. See id. at 4 n.7. Lower courts found that
ERISA preempted both of these state regulations. See American Med. Sec. Act, Inc. v. Bartlett,
915 F. Supp. 740, 746 (D. Md. 1996); Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Angoff, 937 S.W.2d 277
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
186. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 403.
189. See id. at 404. There was no allegation "that the reduction of AIDS benefits was intended to deny benefits to McGann for any reason which would not be applicable to other beneficiaries who might then or thereafter have AIDS .... " Id.
190. See id. at 405.

54
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19 1
clause and brought it within the scope of ERISA's preemptory power.
In contrast to McGann, however, the Sixth Circuit held that totally
self-insured plans were not entirely immune from traditional state insurance regulation by operation of the deemer clause. 192 Rather, the Sixth
Circuit held that some federal interest in the uniformity of administration must outweigh the expressed federal interest in the states' regulation of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act in order for the
deemer clause to override the savings clause, otherwise affording exemption for state insurance laws. 193 The court stated that this approach
allowed a reconciliation of the competing federal policies of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and ERISA and was not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's dicta in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts. 194 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, the deemer clause does
not bar operation of the state law when there is "no demonstrated interest in national uniformity and preemption of the state law would substantially disrupt a state regulatory scheme generally applicable to both
insured and self-insured ERISA plans ....195

B.

Stop-Loss Coverage of Self-Insured Plans

Currently, the federal circuits are split regarding the extent of permissible state regulation regarding stop-loss coverage of self-insurance
plans. The ambiguous nature of these plans drives part of the confusion
behind this split. Self-insured plans may be fully funded by the employer so that all risk is borne by the employer without recourse to an
outside insurance policy. State regulation of these plans is preempted
by ERISA. 196 More commonly, however, the self-insuring employer
seeks stop-loss coverage to limit the risk of catastrophic loss. 197 When
a self-insuring employer uses stop-loss coverage, the employer pays all
claims up to a certain limit or trigger-point. Above the trigger-point, a

191. The court does not discuss what, if any, claims would have been available to McGann
under state tort law. See generally McGann, 946 F.2d 401. McGann, however, alleged discriminatory motive in the amendment of the plan. See id. at 404. Under state tort law, this might have
been characterized as bad faith and a non-ERISA plan might be found liable. See, e.g., Cathey v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 391-93 (Tex. 1991).
192. See Northern Group Serv., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 95 (6th Cir. 1987).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 94; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-41,
747 (1985).
195. Northern Group, 833 F.2d at 95.
196. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
197. See Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope
of FederalPreemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 249 (1997).
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198
commercial insurance company assumes the risk of paying claims.
When a self-insured employer uses this stop-loss coverage to control its
risk, the courts must determine whether laws governing these otherwise
self-insured plans are preempted because of the deemer clause or saved
because the stop-loss coverage causes the plan to revert to insurance. 199

The Supreme Court has yet to address the question of stop-loss coverage in partially self-insured plans. The courts that have addressed the
issue have reached no clear consensus. Some courts take a purely textual approach when interpreting these contracts and find them to be free
from state regulation by the action of the deemer clause. 2° Other courts
take a more functional view, considering the process and effect of the
stop-loss insurance rather than the name the insurer uses to describe the
20 1
plan.
The disparate means of analyzing stop-loss plans leads to inconsistent
results, depending upon the district in which the claim is brought. Some
courts, notably the Sixth Circuit, have not found that ERISA preempts
20 2
state laws purporting to regulate stop-loss coverage as insurance.
Other courts have found state law to be preempted.20 3 The net effect of
this circuit split is to create a national inconsistency in the regulation of
employee benefits plans that are partially self-insured. 2°
198. See Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on SelfInsured Health Plans, 14 VA. TAX REV. 615, 626 (1995).
199. See Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption under the Deemer
Clause as Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307,
312-13 (1997).
200. But see Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d
308 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that as long as the plan purchases insurance from an insurer offering
health insurance, it is subject to state regulation of insurance).
201. See, e.g., Thompson v. Talquin Building Prod. Co., 928 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that stop-loss insurance is designed to protect the employer from catastrophic losses, not to provide health or accident insurance to the participant); United Food & Commercial Workers Trust
v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that stop-loss provider did not pay benefits to
participant or take over administration of the plan, thus, the plan should properly be considered a
self-insured plan despite using a commercial insurer).
202. See Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308; see also Northern Group Serv., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins.
Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that state law requiring insurers to offer coordination of
benefits provisions was not preempted by ERISA).
203. See Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (holding that a self-insured plan that purchases stop-loss coverage is not insurance for the purpose of saving it from preemption); Moore v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that because the "trigger point" was
never reached, there was no insurance contract eligible for regulation involved in the plaintiff's
claim and it was preempted); St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp.
931, 933-34 (D. Minn. 1980).
204. See, e.g., Northern Group, 833 F.2d at 90-91 (preempting state law regulating insurance
when plan is insured by an outside carrier only for stop-loss); Bone v. Association Management
Serv., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 493, 495 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that characterization of a plan as
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C. Preclusionof State Common Law Claims
State tort law has developed to protect citizens from encroachment by
other citizens and commercial enterprises through compensation and, in
some cases, punishment. Arguably, the congressional intent of the
savings clause was to achieve the purpose of "saving all state law regulating insurance, including state decisional law." 20 5 If this were Congress' intent, the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co.
v. Dedeaux20 6 clearly frustrated it.
In Pilot Life, the Court held that state common law does not fall
within the savings clause. 20 7 The Court reasoned that in order to regulate insurance within the requirements of the clause, the law must not
only have an impact on insurance, but must also be specifically directed
toward insurance. 20 8 The Court pointed out that bad faith claims derive
from general principles of state tort and contract law and any bad faith
breach of contract may create liability, not just a breach of an insurance
contract.209 Thus, the Court held that bad faith law does not affect
spreading of policyholder risk, has only tenuous effects on the relationship between the insured and the insurer, is not limited to the insurance
industry in its impact, 2 10 and does not meet the criteria of "the business
of insurance" set forth in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 211 Moreover, the
Court concluded that all suits brought asserting improper processing of
claims under ERISA-regulated plans are subject to ERISA's enumer"partially insured" was not appropriate because the stop-loss policy insured only the plan and not
the individual beneficiary); Hutchinson v. Benton Casing Serv., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 831, 838-39
(S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding there was no cause of action for wrongful termination of medical
benefits provided through a stop-loss trust that could not be deemed insurance); Cuttle v. Federal
Employees Metal Trades Council, 623 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (D. Me. 1985) (holding that stop-loss
insurance is not group health insurance but is insurance obtained by self-insuring entity to cover
risks beyond its premiums; application of state law would have been proper except for deemer
clause); Dawson v. Whaland, 529 F. Supp. 626, 632 (D. N.H. 1982) (preempting state law from
covering stop-loss insurance on grounds that plan's benefit provisions were negotiated through a
collective bargaining agreement); General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.
Wis. 1981) (holding that the deemer clause preempted a state statute mandating certain conversion benefits and establishing risk-sharing plan for residents unable to secure coverage); St. Paul
Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931, 933-34 (D. Minn. 1980) (holding
that the deemer clause preempted a state statute that required self-insurers to be members of a
mandatory state-sponsored association to provide reinsurance, even though the statute applied
only some regulations to the group of reinsurers).
205. O'Neil, supra note 165, at 728.
206. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
207. See id.
208. See id. at 50.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 50-51.
211. Id. at51.
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ated remedies. 2 12 As a result, even when a participant or beneficiary
raises issues of bad faith in the claims process, there is no cause of action for punitive damages. 213 Thus, ERISA provides little incentive for
insurance companies to quickly address problems in claims processing
214
to avoid potential negative consequences.
ERISA's preemption of state common law claims, compounded by
the failure to provide similar federal causes of action, creates the obvious inequity of leaving an injured party with no remedy. This is due to
the fact that "[elarly pension and health insurance cases under ERISA
2 15
were often brought in state courts alleging state causes of action."
After removal to federal court, courts have generally dismissed these
early pension and health insurance cases because ERISA preempted
state law. Yet ERISA itself provides no remedy for the claims presented. 16 If state constitutional law governed the issue, it might be
found unconstitutional under an "open courts" clause. 2 17 The United
States Constitution, however, does not provide the same remedial protections. 2 18 This ultimately results in ERISA's failure to meet one of its
express policies: "[t]o protect. . .the interests of participants in

212. See id. at 56.
213. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
214. As a Congressional Report noted:
[L]ittle financial downside exists for an insurance company that routinely delays payment or refuses to pay large claims .... [Elven if a suit is brought and the court finds
that the insurance company has behaved in the most egregious and outrageous way, the
worst that could happen to the insurance company is that it would be forced to pay the
claim it should have paid in the first place.
H.R.REP. NO. 102-1023, at 23-24 (1992).
215. Carr & Liebross, supra note 149, at 225.
216. See id.
217. Thirty-nine state constitutions include clauses, commonly called "open courts" clauses,
that establish the citizens' rights to a remedy for injury. See Mark Thompson, Letting the Air Out
of Tort Reform, 83-May A.B.A. J. 64, 68 (1997). For instance, the Indiana Constitution provides:
"All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and
without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay." IND. CONST. art.
I, § 12 (emphasis added). The Oregon Constitution provides: "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every
man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation." OR. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). The Texas Constitution provides: "All courts
shall be open, and every personfor an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
218. The federal counterpart is found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no
state "shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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employee benefit plans .. .by providing for appropriate remedies, sanc2 19
tions, and ready access to the Federal courts."
IV.

ERISA's POTENTIAL

TO REFORM HEALTH INSURANCE

ERISA contains a framework of federal authority to regulate employee benefits, including health insurance. The bare bones framework,
however, waits to be beefed up. Its intent was to create uniformity of
administration in order to protect both insurers and beneficiaries from
the pitfalls of multiple standards depending on which state is involved.
Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged "[t]he most efficient way to
meet [the responsibilities of employers' administration of employee
benefits] is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures .... "220
The Congressional Record suggests that "Congress wanted the federal common law to be modeled upon the law of collective bargaining
agreements under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 ("LMRA"). 2 2 1 Interpreting the LMRA mandate, the Supreme
Court found it appropriate to look to legislative policy and compatible
state law in order to find the rule most likely to effectuate federal policy. 222 Like the LMRA, ERISA does not provide all of the information
necessary to implement the statute's objectives. Guidance for resolving
ERISA cases can be obtained from the logical implications of ERISA's
express statutory language, its policy and legislative history, and relevant principles of state law. 223 Unfortunately, the Department of Labor,
which is charged with protecting employee rights, believes that it has

219. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
220. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). The Court noted that the
statements of the sponsors of ERISA reflected an awareness of the realities of employee benefits
administration and sought a uniform set of procedures that would guide the processing of claims
and disbursement of benefits. See id.
221. Carr & Liebross, supra note 149, at 225.
222. See id. (citing Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alaska, 353 U.S. 448,
456-57 (1957)). Textile Workers held that the Taft-Hartley Act subsection "gives federal District
Courts jurisdiction in controversies that involve labor contracts in industries affecting commerce,
without regard to diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy." Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at
450. Additionally, the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law
for enforcement of those collective bargaining agreements, which includes specific performance
of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 451.
223. See Carr & Liebross, supra note 149, at 225.
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"no obligation to help people." 224 Based upon specific statutory provisions, 225 it appears the agency is right.
Congress has enacted some reform measures as amendments to
ERISA; however, most amendments to ERISA have been in the area of
pension plan administration. As has become evident to those involved
in or following the debates on health care reform, something must be
done to address problems in health care access in the United States.
Change can only be achieved through amending ERISA. Unfortunately,
the greatest barrier in this process may be the process itself. For example, polls indicated that a substantial majority of Americans supported
health care reform in 1993,226 but it was a dead issue politically by
summer of 1994.227 Although some have suggested possible reasons
the public lost interest, 228 only the result is clear. After months of debate, despite continued evidence that the public was still concerned
about the health care system, the American public simply lost interest. 229 Clearly, effective lobbying and media attention affect the passage of some bills, such as the mother-child hospital stay legislation,
which received considerable national attention. Although such provisions are extremely important to individuals and to society as a whole,
debating each provision separately in a national forum is not the most
efficient way to reform health care and health insurance in America. On
the constantly changing landscape of health care in modern society,
there is a vast array of health care programs and services, and the list
changes almost daily. National debate on coverage of each program or
224. Alan D. Lebowitz, the highest career official at the Pension and Welfare Benefit Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor, stated that it has "no legal obligation to help people, to
put it crudely." Carr & Liebross, supra note 149, at 221. A subsequent internal agency order
(No. 1-92), issued on June 3, 1992, announced a limited assistance program which included an
agency willingness to "intervene on behalf of individuals when there is reason to believe that they
are entitled to benefits, but such intervention will be informal and will not include litigation on
behalf of any individual." Id. at 229 n.2 (citing 19 Pens. Rptr. No. 27 (BNA) 1170 (July 6,
1992)).
225. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(b)(2) (1994) (preventing the Secretary of Labor from pursuing claims on behalf of beneficiaries and participants).
226. See Mollyann Brodie, Americans' Political Participationin the 1993-94 National Health
CareReform Debate, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99, 100 (1996).
227. See id.
228. See id. (suggesting that those with the greatest concerns for health care reform were less
likely to be politically involved); Philip Heymann & Jody Heymann, The Fate of Public Debate
in the United States, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 519 (1996) (suggesting that the American public
does not trust government to tell the truth and became tired of the debate); Mark A. Peterson, The
Limits of Social Learning: TranslatingAnalysis Into Action, 22 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L. 1077
(1997) (suggesting that social learning is often a decidedly political struggle over ideas and information, advanced by lessons designed to serve specific interests).
229. See Brodie, supra note 226, at 100.
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service would significantly impair the resources, both in time and
money, that the political process could invest in other issues of public
concern and jeopardize public involvement in the debate.
More significantly, the politicization of health care appears to make it
more difficult to enact reforms. During 1994, millions of dollars were
spent on advertising to influence the national debate on health care reform, reaching levels in excess of the spending by both sides for a
presidential election. 230 Perhaps legislation affecting the relationship
between members of Congress and their constituencies and fundraisers,
such as term limits and limits on campaign contributions, may be ultimately more effective in resolving health insurance crises than any
other legislation because it may assure that all of the interested voices
have a greater opportunity to be heard by Congress. In the short term,
however, such changes to the political process do not appear forthcoming, and the crisis in health insurance will not improve or disappear on
its own. Therefore, there must be some effort to amend ERISA on a
small but continuing basis to address some of these problems.
A.

Improved Departmentof Labor Enforcement of CurrentLaw

ERISA authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Labor to
act in a number of areas in pension plan administration and employee
benefits.2 31 If the Secretary had more general authority to fully enforce
ERISA welfare benefits regulations, then the problems presented by
state law preemption might have less impact. This does not remove the
public from the process, but it does change the allocation of resources.
Where authority is given to regulate, authority should be given to enforce the regulations. Amending ERISA to provide "mandated benefits" without giving the Secretary of Labor the authority to enforce these
provisions gives only an illusory benefit to the beneficiaries and participants.
Furthermore, eliminating the duty of each beneficiary to act as a private attorney general would allow efficient resolution by the Depart-

230. See Heymann & Heymann, supra note 228, at 516. The advertising was predominantly
funded only on the side opposing reform, possibly limiting a true public dialogue when the voices
of those in need of health care reform could not compete with for-profit organizations or other
monied interests. See id. at 516-17.
231. For example, when an administrator refuses to supply information requested in accordance with ERISA, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to assess a civil penalty up to $1,000 per
day from the date of refusal until the report is filed with the Secretary. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132(c)(2) (1994). The Secretary is explicitly prohibited from exercising his authority to enforce
violations under other parts of the same enforcement scheme, however, unless action is requested
by the Secretary of the Treasury and participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries. See id. § 1132(b).
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ment of Labor through one action against an insurer and would thereby
relieve the courts of a potentially debilitating flood of duplicative cases
against the same defendant. Surely a Congress that has considered tort
reform as a means of controlling access to the courts did not intend to
create a law that would potentially force hundreds into the legal system. 232 The reduction in duplicative litigation would also level the
playing field between insurers who voluntarily comply with federal
regulation and those who maintain "illegal" policies with only minimal
penalties. Although the current overall policy clearly flies in the face of
the stated purpose of ERISA of protecting beneficiaries, authorizing an
administrative exercise of power could remedy this problem.
B.

Establisha Higher Standardof JudicialReview

ERISA contains no express standard of review for decisions made by
plan administrators. 233 The Supreme Court determined that trust law
guides the appropriate standard of review because ERISA is filled with
principles appropriated from the law of trusts.234 Therefore, decisions
made by a plan administrator with discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe terms of the contract are to be reviewed with a deferential standard.2 35 A large number of plans provide
for administrative discretion in benefit determinations, thus, courts are
236
often limited to review plan decisions for an abuse of discretion.
Where terms are disputed or doubtful, the administrator may exercise
reasonable discretion in interpreting terms without fear of reversal.23 7
Where the administrator does not clearly have discretionary authority

232. At least since 1983, Congress has considered questions of tort reform. See Andrew F.
Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 123,
123 n.2 (1998) (noting that the first generic tort reform bill of consequence was S. 44, 98th Cong.
(1983), which would have rewritten the field in all areas, particularly punitive damages). Since
that time, Congress has addressed numerous other proposals. See id. Despite the ongoing concern about tort reform, a recent study suggested that only four percent of all civil actions arise in
tort. See Thompson, supra note 217, at 68 (citing a study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice in
Santa Monica, California).
233. With no guidance from the statute, courts reviewing early plan decisions applied a highly
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to review denial of benefits. See Jonathan P. Heyl,
Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Fourth Circuit's Continued Attempt to Work with the
"DoctrinalHash" of the Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit-Denial Cases, 75 N.C. L. REV.
2382, 2382 (1997).
234. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).
235. See id. at l ll.
236. See Heyl, supra note 233, at 2382.
237. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at I11.
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and the dispute turns on interpretation of terms in a plan, the court re238
views de novo.
Giving deferential review to a plan administrator's decisions essentially gives control of the henhouse to the fox because the plan administrator has a clear mandate to act as a fiduciary whose primary purpose
is to protect the interests of the beneficiary.239 Deferential review is
only appropriate when the decision-maker, a trial court or some other
impartial tribunal, such as an arbitration panel, lacks bias and, therefore,
can be presumed to apply the rules even-handedly.
In contrast, the plan administrator being accorded this deference is an
employee of the party who has allegedly violated the law and, in some
cases, may be the actor who caused the violation. The potential for conflict arises when an employee makes a decision that either costs or saves
his employer money. 24° The potential for bias in this case is not likely
to occur in other situations when the courts use deferential review. Any
decision made that is not clearly in the best interest of the beneficiary is
against the explicit statutory duty of the plan administrator and should
be subject to significant judicial scrutiny.
C. Strengthen Consumer Protectionsin ERISA Plans
ERISA could also be amended to impose specific consumer protections on employer-sponsored health plans. The 105th Congress considered several major bills from both sides of the aisle to reform managed
care and impose consumer protections on managed care plans through
consumer mandates. 24 1 The President also convened a high level task

238. See id. at 115.
239. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994) provides: "(a) Prudent man standard of care. (1) [A] fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (I) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries .. " Id. § 1104(a).
240. One unfortunately common example of the conflict that an administrator may face is the
cost-containment process that determines whether to provide coverage in the managed care context. In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., would-be parents sued their managed care organization alleging that the utilization review services were negligently provided and, as a result, were
responsible for the wrongful death of their unborn child. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,
965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992). The court found their claim preempted by ERISA. See id.
at 1334; see also Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health
Care: The Casefor Managed Federalism,23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997).
241. The major republican bills were the Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 2330, 105th Cong.
(1998) (introduced by Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.)); the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act
of 1997, H.R. 1415, S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Rep. Charlie Norwood (R-Ga.)
and Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.)); and the Patient Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4250, 105th
Cong. (1998) (introduced by Rep. Newton Gingrich (R-Ga.)).
President Clinton's bill was the Health Insurance Consumer's Bill of Rights Act of 1997,
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force to investigate how to improve consumer protections in health
plans. This task force developed recommendations that formed the basis of a democratic consumer protection bill. Several bills before the
106th Congress call for the same type of consumer protections. 242 Yet
Congress has taken little action thus far in pushing these bills to passage.
The consumer protection provisions contained in the bills before the
105th Congress were comprehensive. 243 Specifically, as amendments to
ERISA, these bills required disclosure of extensive information about
plan coverage and benefits as well as available grievance and appeal
procedures. 244 The bills also regulated utilization review and included
use of appropriately trained reviewers, timely review and other protections. 245 Most of the consumer protection provisions required plans to
advise consumers of the medical rationale for decisions. 246 All bills
generally required that medical review criteria, including medical practice guidelines, be based on sound scientific principles and the most recent medical evidence. 247 Finally, most bills also addressed plan quality
248
improvement programs.

H.R. 2967, S. 1499, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced by Rep. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen.
Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.)). The major Democratic bill was the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998,
H.R. 3605, S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced by Sen. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and
Rep. John H. Dingell (D-Mich.)).
All of the bills would impose protections on employer-sponsored plans regulated under ERISA.
See S. 2330 §101(a); H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §301; see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §3(a); H.R. 2967, S.
1499 §202(a); H.R. 4250, §§ 1001-1307. Some bills would extend protections to state regulated
plans. See S. 2330 §303; H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §§201-202; see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2(a)(2);
H.R. 2967, S. 1499 §201(a); H.R. 4250 §§2001-2301. President Clinton's bill would extend
these protections to managed care plans that serve Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. See
H.R. 2967, S. 1499 § 204.
242. Comparable bills before the 106th Congress include the Children's Health Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, H.R. 1661, 106th Cong. (1999); the Comprehensive Managed Health
Care Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 1133, 106th Cong. (1999); the Affordable Health Care Act of
1999, H.R. 1136, 106th Cong. (1999); the Managed Care Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 719, 106th
Cong. (1999); and the Patient Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999).
243. See supra Part II.B.3.d (outlining proposed amendments to ERISA).
244. See S. 2330 §111; H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §121; see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2(a)(2); H.R.
2967, S. 1499 §101; H.R.4250 §§1101, 2101, 3101.
245. See S. 2330 §121; H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §115; see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2(a)(2); H.R.
2967, S. 1499 § 101(2); H.R. 4250 §1201.
246. See H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §115(e); see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2; H.R. 2967, S. 1499
§101; H.R. 4250 §1101. The major Republican bill, S. 2330, provides only for disclosure of a
summary of utilization review procedures. See S. 2330 §111.
247. See S. 2330 § 121; H.R. 3605, S. 1890 § 111 (b); see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2(a)(2); H.R.
2967, S. 1499 § 101(2).
248. See H.R. 3605, S. 1890 §111; see also H.R. 1415, S. 644 §2; H.R. 2967, S. 1499 §101.
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Clarificationof Tort Liabilityfor Plan Conduct

ERISA largely fails to provide a sufficient remedy to an injured
party. Moreover, ERISA effectively eliminates many claims because
the out-of-pocket expense in obtaining legal assistance to reinstate benefits is often not very cost effective, either for the beneficiary or for the
attorney. Although ERISA specifically allows for the award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party, prevailing defendants are almost uniformly
unsuccessful in receiving a fee. 249 When plaintiffs prevail, most circuits
use a five-part test to determine whether attorneys' fees should be
awarded. 250 As a result, the outcome of a claim for attorney's fees is
highly unpredictable. 25 1 However, once a court makes a decision on
252
attorney's fees, it is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the list of available claims does not necessarily reflect
the types of claims that might have been available in the pre-ERISA
era.253 Congress designed ERISA to eliminate the abuses of the employee pension process, yet ERISA has effectively created the potential
to perpetuate the same kinds of abuse in employee benefit plans that
existed before ERISA's enactment. The failure to create real deterrent
effects for abuses does little to promote the intent of the Act. Thus,
Congress should amend ERISA to address at least three issues: (1) judicial interpretation of preemption provisions; 254 (2) guidelines for federal

249. See ERISA Attorneys' Fees; Part I1: Discretion Continued, 4 No. 6 ERISA LITIG. REP.
22, 23 (1996).
250. See id. at 22. The five-factor test was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Eaves v. Penn
and has since been applied to varying degrees in other jurisdictions. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d
453, 453 (10th Cir. 1978). Under this test, attorney's fees are only awarded after weighing:
(1) the degree of the offending party's culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the offending party to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; (3) whether an award of attorneys'
fees would deter other persons in similar circumstances; (4) the benefit conferred by
the action on other participants or a plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the
parties' positions.
Id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Prior to the adoption of ERISA, a claim against an insurance provider for denial of benefits was usually brought under state contract law, and to a lesser extent, under state trust law. See
George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: ExtracontractualDamages Mandatedfor Benefit Claims Actions,
36 ARIz. L. REv. 611, 611 (1994). None of these common law claims is available to injured
beneficiaries and participants as a result of the Supreme Court's determination that Congress did
not intend to save the common law under ERISA's savings clause. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
254. See infra Part IV.D. 1 (providing guidance to the judiciary in interpreting the preemption
provisions).
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common law relating to ERISA; 255 and (3) specific mandatory remedies
256
for failing to fulfill ERISA mandates.
1. Guidance to the Judiciary in Interpreting the Preemption Provisions
Despite the Supreme Court's determination that section 502(a) provides the exclusive source for civil enforcement, preempting state
257
common law actions that do not regulate the "business of insurance,"
ERISA's text clearly suggests that state decisional law was intended to
be within the scope of state law that might be "saved" from preemption. 258 The Supreme Court noted in a footnote that: "[d]ecisional law
that 'regulates insurance' may fall under the saving clause . . . . For purposes of § 514, '[t]he term "State law" includes all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State."2 59 The effect of this interpretation would be to recognize state
common law that "relates to" employee benefit plans just as the Court
recognizes state statutory law that "relates to" employee benefit plans.
If Congress takes this approach, courts can better protect individuals because most states have lengthy histories leading to the adoption of specific rules. The difficulty in recognizing any state law (statutory or
common) is that it re-creates the diversity of standards that insurers
must meet when they offer insurance in different states. The diversity
of standards already exists, however, because of the saving of statutory
law. 26° Thus, recognition of state common law should not make this diversity any more deplorable from a legal perspective.
2. Guidance for Developing a Federal Common Law Furthering the
Purposes of ERISA
Courts generally restrict federal common law development to areas
that are either consistent with a federal statute or that fill the gaps, oversights, ambiguities or neglected procedural questions of the statute. As
one court explained:
A federal court may create federal common law based on a federal
statute's preemption of an area only where the federal statute does not

255. See infra Part IV.D.2 (offering guidance for developing a federal common law furthering
the purposes of ERISA).
256. See infra Part IV.D.3 (outlining specific remedies for failing to fulfill ERISA mandates).
257. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 41.
258. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(c)(1), (2) (1994) (defining "state law" as including every law,
decision, rule, regulation, and all other state actions that affect the law).
259. PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 48 n.l (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144 (c)(1), (2)).
260. See supra notes 134, 136, 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing the savings clause
as it relates to preemption).
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Furthermore, even

when it is appropriate for a federal court to create federal common
law, it may use state common law as the basis of the federal common
law only if the state law is261consistent with the policies underlying the
federal statute in question.
One of the policies underlying ERISA is to protect beneficiaries from
the failure of the plan to provide contractual benefits. If this policy
statement is insufficient to guide courts in determining which state
common law may be consistent with the federal policies, then it is essential that Congress speak to the courts as to its intent for the interpretation of ERISA. At this point, there are substantial gaps between the
pure text of ERISA and the purpose statements both within its text and
in its legislative history; thus, it is vital that Congress provide clarification so courts may implement the will of Congress. Congress can approach this task in several ways. First, although unlikely and unwieldy,
Congress could directly specify the rules it wished courts to follow by
incorporating more concrete language into ERISA itself. For example,
Congress could specify when to apply state common law, or Congress
could adopt statements by specific recommending committees, such as
the Restatements of the Law or Model Codes.
Second, and more appropriately, Congress could directly address the
standards and duties to be imposed upon the parties involved. Specifically, Congress should impose duties of good faith and fair dealing and
other common duties from state agency, contract, and tort law in order
to meet the expectations of participants in employee benefit plans. Instead, if Congress chooses to maintain a fiduciary standard as the guide
for plan administrators, then it must directly address the conflict of interests inherent in the role as well as identify clear and reasonable penalties for violation of the fiduciary duty.
In addition, the rapid growth of self-insured plans, managed care
plans that utilize "mixed" provider-insurer structures, and other innovative health provider networks has created concerns regarding quality of
care. Where these plans fall within the scope of ERISA preemption,
Congress must provide guidance as to the applicable standards. Although states address these issues in a variety of ways, some generally
applicable rules, which would not change the requirements most insurers must meet when their plans fall within the state's control, are available. The common law has a long history of protecting beneficiaries
and this excellent resource should not be dismissed. Again, Congress

261.

Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 957-58 (1 th Cir. 1986).
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could give tremendous guidance to the judiciary simply by adopting
existing sources as a standard for decision-making.
Specific Remedies for Failure to Meet ERISA or Plan Provisions
Penalizing an insurer that discriminates only by requiring the inclusion of the person on the plan is insufficient. This scheme does not encourage compliance, but obstructs the participant or beneficiary who
must often expend considerable resources to compel the insurer to act.
Although ERISA does allow attorney fees for either party, the award of
fees is at the judge's discretion and is inconsistently available.2 62 If the
only remedy available will be injunctive relief, Congress must mandate
payment of attorney fees when an insurer is in violation of ERISA. The
use of a private enforcement scheme is not effective unless the private
individual is protected in the process and has some legitimate expectation that a valid complaint will not cost more than the cost of purchasing
alternative coverage.
The alternative, of course, would be to give the Secretary of Labor
the authority to prosecute these claims on behalf of the beneficiary or
participant. Although this may be a tremendous burden on the agency,
it could effectively serve the purpose of protecting the participants' and
beneficiaries' interests. Along with this transfer of authority, there
should be an opportunity for the Secretary of Labor to seek penalties
commensurate with the harm done. For example, if the Secretary of
Labor discovers a pattern of consistently refusing the same services, a
greater penalty should be imposed, such as a fine for violations, in addition to costs. The Secretary of Labor currently has authority to impose fines for behavior that violates certain provisions of ERISA. Allowing fines for violations of beneficiaries' rights would simply make
the Secretary of Labor's existing powers consistent throughout ERISA.
3.

E.

Regulation of Stop-Loss Insurance

The exclusion of self-insured plans from state regulation has increased the gap in which no regulation exists. This results in many employers avoiding state regulation by becoming self-insured; however,
they obtain stop-loss coverage to lessen the risk of a catastrophic claim.
Although the stop-loss is ostensibly designed to control the employer's
risk, it is often really the primary means of health insurance because the
employer sets a very low threshold. The stop-loss carrier may (and often does) function more as a health insurer than a casualty insurer, be262. See supra notes 94, 249-52 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of attorney fees
awards by judges).
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cause stop-loss coverage is not subject to a mandated minimum level.
Courts have not consistently recognized this distinction. 263 Instead,
courts often take a "form over function" approach, placing these plans
beyond the scope of state regulation.
In order to provide the protection of beneficiaries-an explicit purpose of ERISA-Congress must consider the effect of this gap in the
current regulation. It may either: (1) expressly provide for state regulation of the business of insurance based upon the actual function of an
insurance contract; or (2) set minimum thresholds for stop-loss coverage
based upon the size of the employer. In either instance, it appears this
requires an amendment to the deemer clause to redefine the types of arrangements that may not be deemed insurance.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted ERISA to protect workers and their dependents
from the loss of pensions and other employment benefits. Although
ERISA has in some ways protected workers from harms such as pension
plan insolvency, courts have given it an effect that has perpetuated the
loss of workers' other benefits. In the case of health insurance, Congress has failed to meet its own purpose of providing protection for participants and beneficiaries and must act to remedy this dreadful state.
The courts, ruling within the scope of ERISA, have also failed to protect
these two-fold victims (victimized first by their plan's administration
and second by Congress). In order to meet the stated legislative purpose
of ERISA, Congress must either remedy its textual inconsistencies or
add express protections. If Congress fails to do so, the courts must
work to develop a common law consistent with the policies of ERISA,
as expressed in the purpose statement, in order to protect beneficiaries.
As the law currently stands, no one is acting to assure the protection of
the beneficiaries. Thus, the protections afforded by ERISA remain
merely illusory.

263. See supra Parts II.A-B (defining self-insured benefit plans and explaining stop-loss coverage of self-insured benefit plans).

